Analysis - Brazil 6 - 0 Australia


Analysis - Brazil 6 - 0 Australia

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Damo Baresi
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Analysis: Brazil 6-0 Australia.
by Kate Cohen.

"Australia’s 6-0 loss to a rampant Brazil side came just nine months out from the 2014 World Cup. The nature of the performance worried and angered fans, some of whom have been calling for coach Holger Osieck’s removal for 12 months.

Teams



Late injuries to Hulk and Dani Alves did little to reduce the quality that oozed throughout Brazil’s 4-3-3. AS Roma’s Maicon filled in at right back, whilst another of Brazil’s attacking talents Bernard started on the right wing. Without Oscar, who usually plays as the Number 10, Brazil’s midfield triangle was flipped, with Luis Gustavo the deepest of the three.

Australia also had two notable absentees in Tim Cahill and Luke Wilkshire, replaced in the starting line up by Josh Kennedy and Ryan McGowan respectively. Holger Osieck continued with Matt McKay playing out of position, in the absence of a recognised left back in the 22 man squad.

Matt McKay at Left Back

As I prefaced in my ‘Five Things we’ve Learnt’ for the Guardian, if it wasn’t already clear, it is now glaringly obvious that Matt McKay isn’t a left back. This game, and in particular the opening 35 minutes, was demonstration of how top quality teams ruthlessly exploiting their opponent’s weakest links.

And whilst not all the blame for Brazil’s right-side attacking dominance can be passed solely onto McKay (he wasn’t helped, particularly by Sasa Ognenovski, Tommy Oar and co.), the way in which Brazil exposed him was a key in the early failings of the match.

Brazil’s movement patterns, both ball movements and off-the-ball movements, exaggerated Australia’s weakness at left back – with Bernard moving to isolate McKay in wide areas.


Brazil’s movement patterns to expose Australia’s left side
Example 1



Bernard’s movement dragged McKay (circled), towards the sideline. Ognenovksi did not slide, leaving a large gap between himself and McKay. With a lack of pressure applied to the ball carrier (Holman failed to close down Gustavo), a pass was played in behind for the run of Jo, who had the beating of Ognenovski for pace.

McKay, in this situation, read the situation and recovered his positioning and intercepted the pass. However, as will be discussed further below, Australia was unable to keep the ball for long spells.

After exactly six seconds (the golden rule of pressing), possession was lost and Brazil attacked again – again down Australia’s left, and again exposing McKay.

McKay was again dragged towards the sideline but worryingly, the rest of Australia’s back four (circled) didn’t slide across to close down the space for Brazil to work in. Ognenovski’s central positioning, as demonstrated by the red line, meant that when Brazil played a simple one-two (between Ramires and Bernard), Ramires could burst in behind Australia’s defence. This move nearly resulted in a goal for Brazil, and will be further touched on below.

Example 2



McKay was again dragged wide. As with the previous examples, Ognenovski’s failure to slide across and support McKay meant Maicon could play a pass into the path of Ramires’s burst. As with the first example, McKay read the situation well and intercepted the pass to win back possession. Unfortunately for Australia, they lost possession after exactly six seconds and Brazil scored their first goal as a result.

Example 3 – Brazil’s Second Goal



For Brazil’s second goal, McKay was again isolated. After Brazil won back possession, exactly (and perhaps ironically) six seconds after they had lost it, Maicon was able to move forward. McKay’s slight hesitance, unsure whether to close the ball or track the run of Bernard, meant he was in no-mans-land and Brazil strolled to a 2-0 lead.

This passage of play became the ninth occasion of McKay being targetted and exposed in the first 33 minutes. His teammates gave him minimal support, Ognenovski in particular, but it was clear that Brazil had looked to expose Australia’s weak spot.

On the other flank, Ryan McGowan (also out of position) was given the unwanted task of marking Neymar. With Neymar’s ability and McKay’s isolation on the left, Brazil dominated down both flanks.

Brazil’s Pressure Exposes Australia’s Deficiencies

“When you don’t play the ball accurate from defence and you give them away easily and the other team, like Brazil, they press and that is what we have to work on and to learn to play the ball under high pressure.” – Holger Osieck, post-match

Brazil, as expected, hogged the ball for large spells, and whenever possession was lost, they pressed immediately with incredible intensity. This exposed Australia’s inability to play through the pressure – i.e. keeping possession for long enough, normally 6-8 seconds, after which the opposition’s pressing intensity generally drops. This meant many spells of Australian possession were short, and resulted in giving the ball back to Brazil.

As Osieck and his players noted, possession was lost too easily. And whilst Lucas Neill declared them often to be “unforced errors”, Brazil’s pressing intensity perhaps made them ‘forced’.

All three first half goals came as a direct result of possession being lost under pressure.

Goal 1



Six seconds after Australia won back possession, Brazil won the ball back and went on to score. McKay’s pass (after he had intercepted a pass to win the ball back) put Kennedy under pressure, from both directions. David Luiz regained possession for Brazil and passed to Neymar who (circled) was in a position to take on McGowan 1v1.

Goal 2 (as discussed above)

Goal 3



Australia lost possession in the black circled area after pressure was applied to Robbie Kruse. Neymar exploited Australia’s high line (which was incredibly staggered) and was too fast for any recovering defenders.

Sasa Ognenovski

As highlighted above, Ognenovski’s reluctance to slide towards McKay as the ball moved into wide areas played a large part in Brazil’s ability to get in behind Australia time and time again. Ognenovski, 34, on top of his poor positioning, was sluggish and too slow to react when the ball did get in behind the defence.

This resulted in Jo, and later Pato, exposing his lack of sharpness with darts to the front post. At every opportunity, Brazil’s strikers made a front post run and Ognenovski was often the player who was left wanting. His inability to match them for pace/reaction meant they successfully moved across, and in front of him, to reach the ball first at the front post.

Example 1



In the 5th minute (the example discussed previously), a Ramires burst from midfield exposed the gigantic space between McKay and Ognenovski. As the cross from Ramires was fizzed across the 6-yard box, Jo made a front post run, getting in front of Ognenovski. It nearly resulted in a goal, and at this stage of the match, already, Australia could have already been 2-0 down (after already having nearly conceded in the 3rd minute)

Example 2 – Brazil’s Fifth Goal



The fifth goal was a similar story, but this time substitute Pato was the player getting in front of Ognenovski, and Brazil scored. Despite there being issues with the lead up play, which saw Lucas Neill get dragged out of position, Ognenovski was again exposed by a near post run. Pato got in front of Ognenovski and, in that area of the box, only an incredible Schwarzer save would have prevented a goal. As it was, Schwarzer couldn’t keep out the shot and Brazil went 5-0 up.

What does this tell us?

A loss to Brazil isn’t unfathomable, in fact it was expected. Some have said the result is a ‘wake up call’ for the Socceroos. I would like to counter that notion – this was not a wake up call, rather a culmination of poor performance after poor performance where Australia’s objective (to qualify for the World Cup) was unspectacularly achieved.

In the last 12 months, excluding East Asian Cup matches (as the qualifying and tournament predominately involved second and third string players), Australia has put in poor performances against Jordan (away, loss), Iraq (away, win), Romania (away, loss) and Oman (home, draw).

These poor performances were seemingly forgotten by most, as a courageous defensive performance against Japan, a thrashing of Jordan and an 84th minute winner against a severely understrength Iraq side saw Australia achieve their objective.

The grumbles and groans, after this result, are now howls. Something has to change.

Australia will go to the World Cup and compete against the very best international teams in the world and, at the very least, one world class opponent like Brazil. As John Kosmina hinted to in Fox Sports’ post-match coverage, Australia’s greatest fear – being embarrassed on the world stage, might be realised.

If nothing changes, THAT will be the true wake up call ".


http://leopoldmethod.com.au/analysis-brazil-6-0-australia/

Edited by Damo Baresi: 11/9/2013 04:48:41 PM
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Damo Baresi wrote:
[b]Holger Osieck continued with Matt McKay playing out of position, in the absence of a recognised left back in the 22 man squad.

Matt McKay at Left Back

As I prefaced in my ‘Five Things we’ve Learnt’ for the Guardian, if it wasn’t already clear, it is now glaringly obvious that Matt McKay isn’t a left back. This game, and in particular the opening 35 minutes, was demonstration of how top quality teams ruthlessly exploiting their opponent’s weakest links.

And whilst not all the blame for Brazil’s right-side attacking dominance can be passed solely onto McKay (he wasn’t helped, particularly by Sasa Ognenovski, Tommy Oar and co.), the way in which Brazil exposed him was a key in the early failings of the match.

Edited by Damo Baresi: 11/9/2013 04:48:41 PM



McKay has been struggling at LB for some time. He doesn't have the recovery if beaten, or the general speed over the turf, the tackling, ball winning, or jockeying ability for the LB position in BPO .

He is often caught out in accelerated attacks and defensive transitions, particularly as our two CBs are not quick over the turf either, although quite good readers of the game. Mistakes made further up the pitch in BP leading to opposition accelerated attacks , or inadequate pressure on the opposition ball carriers, can have dire consequences for McKay. Oar is much quicker over the turf.

McKay has played very well in almost every game he has played for Australia as a central midfielder. Give the poor bloke a rest from LB! He only looks marginally comfortable against the weakest teams at LB. I'd hate to see McKay dropped from the Socceroos for struggling at LB when he has been one of the best players in the team in central midfield.
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Damo Baresi wrote:
Analysis: Brazil 6-0 Australia.
by Kate Cohen.


Brazil’s movement patterns, both ball movements and off-the-ball movements, exaggerated Australia’s weakness at left back – with Bernard moving to isolate McKay in wide areas.



Edited by Damo Baresi: 11/9/2013 04:48:41 PM


I've always enjoyed Kate or Fezzie Torres' ( as known on 442) analyses, but I'm on my way though the game in a second look at about the 34 minute mark.

In terms of 1v1 duels at this stage of the game, McGowan has been involved in 9 attacking or defensive duels, and McKay has not yet been engaged in one!

McGowan , at his stage of the game , has been targeted more individually, because of Neymar's incredible attacking 1v1 dribbling skills isolating McGowan more, than McKay.

Bresciano at number 6 and Neill at number 3 have probably been in closer proximity to McGowan, than Jedinak at number 8 and Ogger at number 4 have been to McKay.

At this stage McKay has not been dribbled around on one occasion, yet we are two goals down. McGowan has been beaten 4 times and given away a free kick in another 1v1 encounter where he was in a defensive 1v1 mode.
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Damo Baresi wrote:
Analysis: Brazil 6-0 Australia.
by Kate Cohen.


Brazil’s movement patterns to expose Australia’s left side
Example 1



Bernard’s movement dragged McKay (circled), towards the sideline. Ognenovksi did not slide, leaving a large gap between himself and McKay. With a lack of pressure applied to the ball carrier (Holman failed to close down Gustavo), a pass was played in behind for the run of Jo, who had the beating of Ognenovski for pace.


Edited by Damo Baresi: 11/9/2013 04:48:41 PM


There was no problem with Ogger covering the position he did in a zonal defensive system. The problem was the communication between him and Neill. Neill should have been covering the number 9 and being goal side, also positioning Ogger with verbal communication as he was in the better position to communicate being behind him and looking across to the Australian LB position. McGowan should've been covering the back post area and Neymar.

Also, when running backwards towards goal it is incumbent on the number 6 and 8, Bresc and Jedda, to be organising the defensive line and keeping compact with the 3 and 4 for the possible second ball.


Maybe I'm confusing the second and first goals?

Actually in one, maybe the first, there was too much of a gap between Ogger and McKay, when Holman made a poor pass further up the pitch. A Brazilian player received the ball, splitting Ogger and McKay. Ogger should've communicated more quickly to McKay in the defensive transition to move backwards, and the subsequent accelerated attack.

I stand corrected.#-o







Edited by Decentric: 11/9/2013 11:09:49 PM

Edited by Decentric: 11/9/2013 11:28:12 PM
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Damo Baresi wrote:

After exactly six seconds (the golden rule of pressing), possession was lost and Brazil attacked again – again down Australia’s left, and again exposing McKay.


The 6 second rule?

Is the 6 seconds this in the Defensive Transition? That is, the moment a team loses possession.

I thought it was 40 seconds for international football in BPO or Ball Possession Opposition?

If Hawk Saint Victory, Possession Football, Brew, Gregory Parker, Andy Jackson, Fatida, Football God, Steelinho, Kriss Krash, PV4, are reading this, or anybody else, can you expound?

I've learnt this somewhere in a coaching course, and listening to Hiddink, but it is a bit nebulous .

Edited by Decentric: 11/9/2013 11:51:15 PM
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I'd imagine the 6 seconds refers to a nominal period of time that is considered the "transition" after which time if you haven't won the ball back it's now considered BPO not BP>BPO transition.

I remember reading about Guardiola coaching Barca to press to win the ball back within 6 seconds and if they didn't then they retreated to their defensive structure - which may have been where it originated.
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I have never studied the whole 6 second rule as a technical thing, but I've had many coaches use 6 seconds as a guide to winning the ball back.

Basically I've been taught that if you lose the ball, you bust your gut for 6 seconds to get it back. If you haven't gotten it back in that time, you've lost possession and you should get back into a defensive structure. If you did win the ball back in that time, you haven't exactly turned over possession.

And realistically you're not going to be keeping up that level of intensity for many more seconds than 6 anyway. You would have either gotten majorly buggered, or the person who is running away with the ball you gave them has run into a roadblock or sorts.

Probably the best example of someone in the HAL who performs the 6 second rule is Ruben Zadkovich. He turns it over enough, yet busts his guts afterwards, to see it.
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Barcelona Defensive Transition
Posted on June 6, 2012 by Admin By Jimmy Shan

Barcelona are renowned for playing mesmerising, tantalising football. I have no doubt that they are and have been for a number of years the in team in terms of their attacking brand of football and their possession dominance. Every aspiring youth coach will dissect the way they play, the individual brilliance of Xavi, Iniesta, Messi and co…. but is their dominance purely down to what they do with the ball?


The answer is no… Pep Guardiola has publicly stated that he does not rate his team without the ball, when you think deeper how many naturally defensive minded players does he have at his disposal?

The biggest challenge Pep Guardiola faced was to improve the work rate of his players, there mentality without the ball and the introduction of the 6 second rule. This was the tactical masterstroke that put the final piece in the Barcelona DNA jigsaw.

If Barcelona weaknesses were to be without the ball what better tactics to assist their ability to retain the ball for long periods of time than to implement a strategy to regain the ball back as early as possible in transition.

This in turn saw Guardiola implementing the 6 second rule, demanding a regain of possession within 6 seconds. In training Guardiola religiously times how long a team is without the ball, the 6 second count down encourages the team to regain the ball quickly.

Barcelona’s in possession game is based around short fast passes and interchanges which lends itself nicely to the 6 second rule due to the team’s natural compact shape.

The 6 second rule is based around quick transition, the ability to smother the ball and act positively to react to attempt to crowd out spaces and passing options. The nearest 2-3 players are key to the success of this process, an ability to press aggressively with no fear, with the knowledge that back up is close to hand. These players press with an intensity and a predictably which enables supporting players to take up positions that are relevant to this. With 2-3 players affecting the ball the remaining 7-8 ensure compactness and often will see all players well with inside an area the size of quarter of a pitch. Key roles for these players will be to position themselves into dare positions, tempting a pass to enter their zone so that they can press and harass. Players furthest from the ball will ensure there is a balance to the team compactness / shape, this is of paramount importance.

Often pressing this aggressively (harassing) will see / force an opposition into making mistakes, forcing passes, making hurried decisions, miss placing passes etc. These mistakes will often see the return of possession to Barcelona. In situations where there is a regain of the ball, the tactical thought process seems to be geared around stealing possession and moving it on quickly. Of course the ability to manage the ball in a tight area and have technical excellence is a big benefactor in playing / utilising this defensive strategy.

The Barcelona transition master class is not all about the 6 second rule, if the team fail to win the ball back in this time frame they will fall back into a very English like 4 4 2. Once this shape has been established from this base the pressing phase can restart – typically responding to traditional pressing triggers (square pass, long travelling pass etc.) Again the ability to steal it and move it on quickly is a key factor and often executed with such elegance, speed and finesse.

Barcelona Defensive Transition
Posted on June 6, 2012 by Admin By Jimmy Shan

Barcelona are renowned for playing mesmerising, tantalising football. I have no doubt that they are and have been for a number of years the in team in terms of their attacking brand of football and their possession dominance. Every aspiring youth coach will dissect the way they play, the individual brilliance of Xavi, Iniesta, Messi and co…. but is their dominance purely down to what they do with the ball?




The answer is no… Pep Guardiola has publicly stated that he does not rate his team without the ball, when you think deeper how many naturally defensive minded players does he have at his disposal?

The biggest challenge Pep Guardiola faced was to improve the work rate of his players, there mentality without the ball and the introduction of the 6 second rule. This was the tactical masterstroke that put the final piece in the Barcelona DNA jigsaw.

If Barcelona weaknesses were to be without the ball what better tactics to assist their ability to retain the ball for long periods of time than to implement a strategy to regain the ball back as early as possible in transition.

This in turn saw Guardiola implementing the 6 second rule, demanding a regain of possession within 6 seconds. In training Guardiola religiously times how long a team is without the ball, the 6 second count down encourages the team to regain the ball quickly.


Barcelona’s in possession game is based around short fast passes and interchanges which lends itself nicely to the 6 second rule due to the team’s natural compact shape.

The 6 second rule is based around quick transition, the ability to smother the ball and act positively to react to attempt to crowd out spaces and passing options. The nearest 2-3 players are key to the success of this process, an ability to press aggressively with no fear, with the knowledge that back up is close to hand. These players press with an intensity and a predictably which enables supporting players to take up positions that are relevant to this. With 2-3 players affecting the ball the remaining 7-8 ensure compactness and often will see all players well with inside an area the size of quarter of a pitch. Key roles for these players will be to position themselves into dare positions, tempting a pass to enter their zone so that they can press and harass. Players furthest from the ball will ensure there is a balance to the team compactness / shape, this is of paramount importance.

Often pressing this aggressively (harassing) will see / force an opposition into making mistakes, forcing passes, making hurried decisions, miss placing passes etc. These mistakes will often see the return of possession to Barcelona. In situations where there is a regain of the ball, the tactical thought process seems to be geared around stealing possession and moving it on quickly. Of course the ability to manage the ball in a tight area and have technical excellence is a big benefactor in playing / utilising this defensive strategy.

The Barcelona transition master class is not all about the 6 second rule, if the team fail to win the ball back in this time frame they will fall back into a very English like 4 4 2. Once this shape has been established from this base the pressing phase can restart – typically responding to traditional pressing triggers (square pass, long travelling pass etc.) Again the ability to steal it and move it on quickly is a key factor and often executed with such elegance, speed and finesse.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Cs0IemkVKs






Edited by Damo Baresi: 12/9/2013 08:48:14 PM
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Damo Baresi wrote:
Barcelona Defensive Transition
Posted on June 6, 2012 by Admin By Jimmy Shan


The Barcelona transition master class is not all about the 6 second rule, if the team fail to win the ball back in this time frame they will fall back into a very English like 4 4 2. Once this shape has been established from this base the pressing phase can restart – typically responding to traditional pressing triggers (square pass, long travelling pass etc.) Again the ability to steal it and move it on quickly is a key factor and often executed with such elegance, speed and finesse.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Cs0IemkVKs


Edited by Damo Baresi: 12/9/2013 08:48:14 PM


I've noticed this getting back into 4-4-2 with the Socceroos in BPO, as Kate has.

I was thinking Holger was using some weird practice, but I haven't observed Barca deploying it, although I haven't watched them anywhere near as much as the Socceroos.

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When will Australia give the young ones a go, my guess we will be out in the 1st round at 2014 World Cup, why , because we did nothing to bing change.
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Australia versus Brazil was used at the start of the FFA Regional Conference, to devise model training ground sessions to improve weaknesses in Australian Socceroos!!!!!
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If I was a football scout I would be looking for players in Brazil and definitely not in Australia.
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