[size=6]Is Sunday's Final A Case Of 'Keep The Ball, Win The Match?'[/size]

For some, Inter’s victory over Barcelona in the Champions League semi-final back in April signalled a critical fracture in the hegemony of possession football. The Catalans had mesmerised Europe with their wonderful monopolising of the ball and fluid circulation. But the victory of Jose Mourinho’s side signalled, to some, that the transfixing spell could be broken, and countered through strong collective resistance.

People may have argued the same thing after Spain’s opening game defeat to Switzerland too - a match in which the Spanish enjoyed 63% possession - as Ottmar Hitzfeld’s highly-systemised side negated the attacking threat of the opposition by packing defensive areas with well organised, disciplined players. If a modest side like the Swiss could do it, then why couldn’t anybody else?

The key for Spain, as obvious as it sounds, was simply in their execution (or lack of it). Against Switzerland they became clogged in central areas. With both Andres Iniesta and David Silva starting, the Swiss were able to predict the tendency of both players to drift inwards, and deployed two wide players tasked with following them. On the left of midfield, for example, Gelson Fernandes - ostensibly a right-footed central midfielder - was used as a means of mirroring Spain’s David Silva (a left-footer on the right). Aside from these counter measures, though, Spain were poor and failed to inject any real variety or dynamism into their play, perpetually struggling to get players in and around the lone forward David Villa.

The issue with high levels of possession is that it can provoke opponents into a back-heavy approach, whereby players are placed behind the ball in an effort to prevent penetration. For the Spanish, they must ask questions of this through innovative movement and by varying the tempo and approach of their attacking play. Against the Swiss, for instance, their opponents were often allowed to go narrow and suffocate the threat because the Spanish had so little width. In fact, Spain have struggled somewhat with this affliction throughout the tournament, which may well help to explain their low goal count and reliance on David Villa’s marvellous all-round game.

In the Dutch, Spain face a side who also line up in a 4-2-3-1 system, but their approach is vastly different. Generally employing a tough screen of Mark van Bommel and Nigel de Jong in front of the defence, Bert van Marwijk has produced a side that look like they should be folded in the middle - so clearly defined are their defence and attack. Their strong defensive base has meant that very few sides have seriously troubled them, allowing them to win every game so far. Strangely, despite having reached the final, the Dutch have had an unerring lack of fluidity to their attacking play. While the defence is all based on collective cohesion, the efficacy of their forward play appears to be at the mercy of the individual talents of Wesley Sneijder, Arjen Robben, Dirk Kuyt and Robin van Persie.

In all their knockout games so far, they have enjoyed a marginal possession advantage other their opponents. However, unlike Spain, the dictating of play is not their primary aim. For the Dutch, their greatest challenge is simply trying to fuse together the two halves of their team. Their success so far has been in creating a defensive base that is good enough to contain opponents, and then ensuring that they can work what possession they do have into their star individuals, who then go and win them the game. This clear emphasis on specialisation of roles is the complete antithesis of the 'Total Football' ideal they pioneered in the 1970s.

Netherlands will not be particularly uncomfortable when out of possession on Sunday. The key for them is to ensure that they defend well and look to exploit Spain through good transitions and getting the ball to their key players in attacking areas. This is easier said than done, of course. For Spain, they will be aware of the difficulties associated with playing their way through a highly tuned Dutch rearguard. What is for sure, though, is that despite the contrasting styles of these two sides, no particular approach is necessarily better than the other. The winner will be the one who manages to execute their game the best.
http://www.goal.com/en-us/news/67/world-cup/2010/07/09/2017350/world-cup-2010-comment-is-sundays-final-a-case-of-keep-the