July 3, 2013 at 2:26 am
WCQ Analysis (Part 2): Breaking Down the Socceroos’ AttackPosted by editor
The second part of this analysis examines the performance of individual players during the Socceroo’s World Cup Qualifying matches against Japan, Jordan and Iraq, and looks ahead to the 2014 World Cup.
Individual performances have often been relied upon to secure a result for the Socceroos over the years. Rarely will you hear a Socceroos victory described as a team result. Whether it is a Cahill goal, a Schwarzer save or an Archie Thompson impact substitution, there seems to be a lack of connection and understanding as a group, but this could be a result of Holger Osieck using 57 different players in his 39 games in charge of the Socceroos.
Breaking down the past three matches we can observe the performance of key attacking players and review who may be starting in our first match at the 2014 FIFA World Cup.
Statistical Analysis – Individual Summary
Australia’s Final Third Passing
Player S/Pass U/Pass Total Accuracy SPP UPP Accuracy Key Pass Assists Chance Creation
Robbie Kruse 28 19 47 60% 4 6 40% 5 2 7
Luke Wilkshire 26 18 44 59% 8 14 36% 4 1 5
Tim Cahill 22 12 34 65% 1 1 50% 2 0 2
Tommy Oar 21 14 35 60% 5 9 36% 1 0 1
Brett Holman 15 9 24 63% 2 6 25% 2 0 2
Matt McKay 10 6 16 63% 1 3 25% 1 0 1
Tom Rogic 9 1 10 90% 1 0 100% 2 1 3
Note: Only showing players with 10 or more attempted passes.
Australia’s Final Third Shots
Player On Target Goals Shots Blocked Off Target Total Accuracy
Mark Bresciano 3 1 3 2 8 38%
Tim Cahill 3 1 1 5 9 33%
Brett Holman 1 0 0 2 3 33%
Tom Rogic 1 0 0 2 3 33%
Note: Only showing players with 3 or more shots.
Australia’s Final Third Dribbling
Player Successful Dribble Unsuccessful Dribbling Tackled/Poss. Lost Total Accuracy
Tommy Oar 13 8 2 23 57%
Robbie Kruse 9 8 6 23 39%
Luke Wilkshire 3 1 0 4 75%
Tim Cahill 3 1 0 4 75%
Brett Holman 2 3 2 7 29%
Archie Thompson 1 3 0 4 25%
Note: Only showing players with 4 or more attempted dribbles.
Tactical Breakdown – Player Analysis
#9 Tim Cahill v Joshua Kennedy
Statistically there is not much of a comparison that you can make between the players as Kennedy only played 13 minutes across the three matches. There is however some noticeable statistics from Cahill that warrants further investigation, which includes his impressive performance against Jordan and his low shot accuracy. Referring to the individual summary, we can see that Cahill’s shooting accuracy is not dissimilar to his teammates, so the data indicates that the team may not be creating opportunities for accurate shots at goal. Using video review we can examine Cahill’s performance against Jordan to see if there are any obvious reasons as to why his passing stats are significantly higher, and identifying his possessions, provide analysis that Holger Osieck may be concerned about.
Visually we can see that Cahill had a significant amount of his possessions in wide areas, some where you would not expect a #9 to be. We know that Cahill has spent most of his career playing as a #10 or as a second striker, and currently is even playing deeper in midfield for the New York Red Bulls (USA), so it is not surprising that he would naturally move around the ground looking to get touches on the ball. However with a team that focuses a lot on wide crosses into the penalty area having Cahill getting most of the ball in wide areas is concerning.
Cahill is effectively playing as a false #9, but the main purpose of a false #9 is to create a numerical advantage in midfield (often a 3v2 against an opposition double pivot), however Cahill’s possessions in wide areas does not create danger to the opposition defence, and removes the focal point of the Socceroos attack. In the image above we can see Cahill having the ball out wide and passing it to Oar. With Oar isolated on the wing he has only two players in the middle, and once he receives the ball he looks up to see no available teammates and is tackled, losing possession.
As a result of playing as a false #9 the opposition defenders are left with the choice of following you up the pitch, creating holes in the defence, or allowing that numerical advantage. Against Japan, Cahill was followed by the Japanese defenders and their high block created space for the likes of Kruse to run in behind (as seen above).
However against Iraq, where the opposition played with a low block, the same effect did not occur. Iraq were comfortable with Cahill moving up the field knowing that he will move into wide areas and remove the Socceroos main crossing target. With the opposition playing a low block there is not enough space behind the defence for Kruse or Oar to run in behind, and they are able to maintain their structure throughout most of the game until Holger Osieck made an intelligent substitution.
Joshua Kennedy entered the match and immediately provided the Socceroos with a target man. As seen above, Kennedy still moved into wide areas to contest throw-ins, but maintained most of his positioning in a central zone around the penalty area, and his second touch of the game almost led to a goal scoring opportunity.
In the image below we can see that Kennedy, receiving a vertical pass from McKay, has drawn the Iraq defender and using his body to protect the ball is able to lay the ball off horizontally to Rogic. This pass unfortunately fell short of the feet of Rogic, but had it reached Rogic he would have received the ball in a dangerous position with Bresciano and Thompson either side of him isolated 1v1 against defenders. A penetration pass, shot on goal or a dribble into the box could have created a great opportunity at goal.
It was Kennedy’s central positioning that ultimately led to the goal. In the minute before the goal, we can see in the video below, that Kennedy contested multiple penetration passes from wide and central positions. Importantly, if you watch Kennedy off the ball you can see that he is constantly aware of his position, and where his opponents and teammates are, in order to find space. Kennedy always maintains a central position, and intelligently moves along the defensive line so that he is always standing behind his opposition defender, and ensures he is on the far side of the penalty area so that he can attack the ball at the back post. Kennedy always stands side on to protect his jump for the ball so that opposition defenders can only contest the ball in front of him (or risk giving away a penalty). When Bresciano originally receives the ball, Kennedy takes two steps away from his closest defender, lowers his centre of gravity anticipating the ball to come in and by the time he gets his head to the ball he is perfectly placed between two defenders to put the past beyond the keeper.
Summary
Tim Cahill’s positioning as a #9 is concerning. Fox Sports analysts, Mark Rudan and Patrick Zwaansjik, made note in the coverage of the Japan game that Cahill rarely makes runs in behind the defence, which means that the opposition defence came remain well structured. Kennedy however maintains a central position, and looks to provide an option to lay the ball off, and uses intelligent movement to find space in a highly contested penalty area.
Playing against a team with a high block could mean that Cahill could continue his false #9 role, but that would require a restructure of the attack to provide more focus on the wingers to make runs in behind the central defence instead of maintaining width for crossing opportunities. Against a team with a low block Kennedy would be a more appropriate selection for his ability to hold up the ball, draw defenders and find space in a crowded penalty area.
The Socceroos lack options outside of Cahill and Kennedy. Holger Osieck may be watching the likes of Eli Babalj (AZ Alkmaar, Holland) and Adam Taggart (Newcastle Jets) closely to provide alternate options if Cahill does not fit the #9 role and Kennedy continues to struggle with injuries for his clubs Nagoya Grampus (Japan)
#10 Brett Holman v Tomas Rogic
Similar to the #9 comparison it is hard to compare this data as Holman played significantly more game time than Rogic. However we can see that Rogic’s statistics are incredibly impressive. Rogic has a very high completion rate on his passes, and as a result has more chance creations than Holman. In all categories Rogic has a higher completion accuracy except for shots at goal; where both players managed one shot on target from three attempts.
The most disappointing part of Holman’s data is his 2 penetration passes from 8 attempts. As a #10 you are the creative outlet for the team and unfortunately Holman struggles in this role. Whilst you would expect creative players to have lower accuracy than their teammates, due to a combination of complexity and risk associated with penetration passes, you would still expect a player in the #10 role to create more than 2 chances at goal over 3 different games. Below we can see Holman’s attempted penetration passes and his possessions in the final third, and there is nothing clear to indicate that Holman is favoring a particular area of the final third with his penetration passes, he varies his attack but his overall end product is concerning.
Rogic’s possessions are very similar to Holman, if not slightly deeper as Rogic tends to contribute more to the construction and progression of attacking phases. It is unsurprising to note that Rogic, as a left footed player, tends to play more on the left side of the field but this could be a contributing factor as to why Tommy Oar had his best performance against Iraq.
From the 2010 AFC Futsal Championships, where Rogic was Australia’s highest goalscorer, we can see that Rogic mainly played as a pivot, a position similar to a #9, where the main role is to hold up the ball and play penetrating passes to the wingers. This background is key to Rogic’s role as #10, his ability to hold up the ball, and quick turn, allows him to create space around the edge of the penalty to shoot or complete a key pass.
Summary
Brett Holman has struggled to create chances at goal in the #10 position, whilst Tomas Rogic has shown in a short time on the field that he can create chances in a role that suits his style of play. The #10 position is more natural for Rogic compared to Holman, who had his best season playing on the left wing for AZ Alkmaar (Holland). Rogic may struggle to achieve regular first team football at Celtic (Scotland) where he has been used in a deeper role whilst Brett Holman’s move to Al Nasr (UAE) lacks ambition and could be detrimental to his football.
There are many other players who could play as a #10 including the likes of Tim Cahill, Mark Bresciano (Al-Gharafa, Qatar), Dario Vidosic (Adelaide United) or even Harry Kewell (Melbourne Heart). The #10 position is arguably the most unpredictable when it comes to looking at the potential starting XI for Brazil, and Osieck may even return to the 4-4-2 formation he used early in the qualifying campaign with the likes of Cahill and Brosque (Al Ain, UAE) playing as a second striker.
#7/#11 – Tommy Oar and Robbie Kruse
Analysing the statistics for both Tommy Oar and Robbie Kruse provides clear evidence on the focus on width that has been set by Holger Oseick. Specifically we can see how much of an impact Robbie Kruse has on the Socceroos across the three games, and we can even see that his performance definitely dropped in the Iraq game, justifying his substitution.
Looking individually at Tommy Oar, we can see that he had a relatively quiet performance against Japan and Jordan with some media outlets attributing this to his position. There is a myth being repeated by the Australian media that Tommy Oar plays regularly for FC Utrecht (Holland) as a #10 but this is not true. Oar has played virtually every game on the left side of a midfield diamond where he relies on his leftback Davy Bulthuis to provide width through overlapping runs. It is no surprise then, in the game that featured Oar’s highest contribution came at the same time Matt McKay was allowed to push forward, and have his highest contribution.
Examining the areas in the final third where Oar received possession there was an indication that Oar is forced very wide when he is isolated, and when he does have, an overlapping teammate he can maintain a more central position in a deeper area allowing him to make a greater impact on the game. Oar struggled to contribute with creating chances, being isolated in wide areas he was forced into less effective crosses, and Cahill struggled to find himself in the areas that Oar’s Utrecht teammates find so profitable. The image below provides a perfect example of Oar isolated against the sideline, he is surrounded by his opposition and so is forced to hit a cross into an empty penalty box.
Interestingly there has not been much media coverage of Robbie Kruse’s move to a more central role for Fortunna Dusseldorf (Germany). Kruse began the season as a wide right player, but after a poor start to the season Andriy Vorinin was dropped from the side, and Kruse began to play in a central role. It was this move that kick started his season in Germany in a position where he achieved majority of his team high 9 Bundesliga assists, and earned him a move to Champions League qualifier Bayern Leverkusen (Germany).
Breaking down Kruse’s possessions, and we can see that he is able to drift across the field. Most noticeable are his possessions on the edge of the penalty area, and just inside the penalty area, where he is able to create multiple attempts at goal. Kruse does not require an overlapping player to break into space, but can adapt to his teammates and opposition opponents to find the ball in space and attack opposition players. Contrastingly to the Oar example we can see below that Kruse has multiple players making their way into the box, and he is able to lay the ball across goal for Bresciano to score.
Summary
Both players provide the key attacking threat for the Socceroos, but both could be used more to their advantage. The players will react differently depending on who is playing as the #9, as Oar will most likely pick out the intelligent runs of Kennedy, whilst Kruse will make runs into the space created by Cahill. Finding the right balance is crucial as Australia’s main attacking threat is unquestionably Robbie Kruse.
Other players that could challenge for the #7/#11 positions include Brett Holman, Nikita Rukavytsya (FSV Mainz 05, Germany), Matthew Leckie (Frankfurt, Germany), or local players Archie Thompson (Melbourne Victory) and Dario Vidosic (Adelaide United).
#6/#8 Mark Milligan and Mark Bresciano
Neither player had much impact on the final third, but that is expected with a team playing with a team playing with a double pivot. Holger Osieck has faced criticism in the past for using a very defensive midfield pairing, but that has not been the case recently after the introduction of Mark Bresciano into the midfield. The team is able to play more of a possession based game, as Bresciano encourages vertical passes that break through the lines of opposition defence, and makes intelligent movements off the ball. The image below is a perfect example of Bresciano receiving the ball in midfield and immediately splitting two opposition players to play the ball to the feet of Brett Holman.
One positive of both players, was their ability to position themselves to recover loose possession, and have shots at goal. Surprisingly Mark Bresciano topped the shot accuracy for the Socceroos (for players with 3 or more attempts at goal) which indicates he has a good ability to read the play and position himself in good goal scoring positions. The image below shows an example of Milligan finding space in the penalty area for a shot at goal, whilst Bresciano has taken up a position outside the penalty area to recover any defensive clearance.
Summary
The #6/#8 combination have not had much of an impact on the final third but this is not surprising. One positive aspect was their ability to find themselves in good goal scoring positions as they remained a dangerous threat in the final third.
Both players will face the challenge of keeping their spots in the starting XI against the impressive club form from the likes of James Holland (FK Austria Wien, Austria) and especially Mile Jedinak (Crystal Palace, England). Holger Osieck has a history of rewarding players with loyalty despite their club form and the form/quality of other available players, so consistent performances for the national team could see them in the starting XI in Brazil.
#2/#5 Matt McKay and Luke Wilkshire
The statistics available on the Socceroos fullacks clearly shows that Holger Osieck favours the right side of the field when attacking. Luke Wilkshire attempted a team high 22 penetration passes, with a disappointing accuracy of 36%. His right sided teammate Robbie Kruse attempted half as many penetration passes and had more chance creations. Wilkshire has also struggled to hold his starting position at Dynamo Moscow (Russia) after the emergence of Nikita Chicherin, so this could explain the drop in quality of his crosses.
Matt McKay also had a poor accuracy in his passing but he only had 4 attempts at a penetration pass. As previously mentioned his lack of contribution in the final third against Japan and Jordan left Oar isolated, so Holger Osieck will have to decide if he wants both fullbacks to go forward and overlap, or if he continues with the focus on the right side of attack.
Summary
The left back position has arguably been Australia’s weakest position for depth and talent for over a decade now. McKay does not play as a left back for his club side Changchun Yatai (China), and the second choice left back Michael Zullo struggles to get game time at FC Utrecht (Holland). Other options include Aziz Behich (who recently moved to Bursaspor (Turkey) where he is the third choice left back behind Brazilian Wederson and Hakan Aslantas, and Jason Davidson (who has struggled to find gametime at Heracle (Holland) where he mainly plays as a central defender. However there is some hope that Melbourne Victory left back Adama Traore may gain citizenship before the World Cup.
One player who has evaded the attention of Holger Oseick is Shane Lowry, who regularly plays as a left back for Millwall in the Championship. If he can gain the attention of Oseick he may be the most appropriate player to start in Brazil.
The right back position also lacks depth with backup options Jade North (Brisbane Roar) and Ryan McGowan (Shandong Luneng, China) both playing as central defenders for their respective clubs. Alternatively Ivan Franjic (Brisbane Roar) has also received recent call-ups to the national team, but he could be playing in a more advanced role at Brisbane Roar this season.
Conclusion
Holger Oseick has a lot of considerations to take into account heading into the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. His preferred set up of a direct 4-4-2 with two holding midfielders has been changed recently to accommodate a #10 in a more possession based 4-2-3-1. The preferred attacking style focuses on relentless crosses from wide positions in the final third, but the analysis in Part 1 has shown that style of play was not as effective as a central based attack.
The player analysis indicates that Tim Cahill’s role as almost a false #9 has been detrimental to the crossing style of play, and that Joshua Kennedy may be a better option. There is also an indication that Tomas Rogic may be a more appropriate fit for the #10 role, and there seems to be a link between the performance of Tommy Oar and the inclusion of an overlapping fullback. Aside from these potential changes the roles of Robbie Kruse, Luke Wilkshire and the #6/#8 combination of Mark Milligan/Mark Bresciano seem to have a secure position in the starting XI for the time being, however further individual analysis could be done to improve on individual skills – such as Luke Wilkshire’s crossing and the dribbling from Robbie Kruse.
Overall the data has shown that Australia is capable of a possession based game, and hopefully the findings in both parts to this analysis will have already been addressed by Holger Osieck and his support staff.
http://leopoldmethod.com.au/wcq-analysis-part-2/Edited by Damo Baresi: 3/7/2013 07:12:55 PM